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The Fukushima-Daiichi Accident demonstrated the need of assessing and strengthening institutions
involved in nuclear safety, including the accountability of regulators. There are a few problems hindering
the path towards a greater understanding of accountability systems, the ensemble of mechanisms
holding to account the nuclear regulator on behalf of the public. There is no consensus on what it should
deliver and no systematic assessment method exists.
This article proposes a method of assessing institutions based on defence in depth concepts and
inspired from risk-assessment techniques used for nuclear safety. As a ﬁrst step in testing the proposal, it
presents a simple Monte-Carlo simulation, illustrating some of the workings of the method of assessment
and demonstrating the kind of results it will be able to supply. This on-going work will assist policy-
makers take better informed decisions about the size, structure and organisation of a nuclear regulator
and the cost-effective funding of its accountability system. It will assist in striking a balance between
efﬁciency and resilience of regulatory decision-making processes. It will also promote the involvement of
stakeholders and allow them to have a more meaningful impact on regulatory decisions, thereby en-
hancing the robustness of the regulatory system and potentially trust and conﬁdence.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Prior to the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident, both the nu-
clear operator and the regulator were seemingly aware that the
plant would be unable to withstand a very large tsunami having
predicted by some of having a credible frequency of occurrence.
The failure of the operator to make the necessary improvements
was caused by institutional shortcomings including in the reg-
ulatory system.
The commission charged by the Japanese government with
investigating the causes of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident not
only found that the plant was ill-defended against tsunamis withr Ltd. This is an open access articlewaves above 10 m but also that such powerful tsunami have far
from negligible frequencies of occurrence in the region (NAIIC,
2012). Despite these studies showing the risks for the plant of the
tsunami hazard to be unacceptable, TEPCO did not make the ne-
cessary improvements and the regulator failed to force its hand.
In its comprehensive report on the accident (IAEA, 2015), the
IAEA argues that the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Authority
(NISA) lacked the authority to have the operator make these
changes and traces this issue to several institutional failings. First,
NISA lacked independence from both the nuclear industry it was
charged to oversee and the ministry promoting nuclear power.
Second, it lacked formal authority due to the complexity of the
regulatory framework. Finally, the government stafﬁng policy and
the rule requiring job rotation every few years in particular hin-
dered NISA staff from gaining the expertise needed (IAEA, 2015).
In 2007, the Japanese Government welcomed an IAEA team of
expert to review its governmental, legal and regulatoryunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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IAEA review report that were pertinent to the Fukushima accident.
In particular, issues related to the independence and the compe-
tences of the regulator (IAEA, 2007). However, Japan resisted in-
ternational calls for regulatory reform (Convention on Nuclear
Safety, 2008).
Despite these deep-rooted institutional failings being identiﬁed
as one of the root causes of the accident, the international nuclear
community has so far focused predominately on engineering and
operational lessons.
To address these needs, a three barrier defence in depth in-
stitutional model for national nuclear systems has been proposed,
consisting of a strong self regulating industry, a strong in-
dependent regulator, both of which are held to account by the
third barrier: strong, diverse and well-informed stakeholders
(Weightman, 2015). The role of nuclear stakeholders is of the ut-
most importance to prevent and mitigate against dual failures of
the regulator and operator such as the one which occurred in Ja-
pan. However, little attention has so far been given to their role in
ensuring that both the operator and the regulator are adequately
performing their duties. The article thus focuses on stakeholders
and the diverse mechanisms which hold the nuclear regulator to
account on their behalf. Collectively, these mechanisms will be
referred to as the system of accountability for the nuclear
regulator.
The ﬁrst section provides some background on regulatory ac-
countability. The following section outlines the literature on reg-
ulatory accountability and argues that progress in the ﬁeld is held
back by a lack of a systematic approach to assess the effectiveness
systems of accountability. The article then proposes a novel
method based probabilistic safety assessments to quantitatively
evaluate the effectiveness of accountability systems. In the ﬁnal
section, a Monte-Carlo simulation depicting a much-simpliﬁed
version of the method of assessment is presented. Its aim is to
illustrate the inner workings of the method of assessment and
demonstrate the kind of results it will be able to supply. This work
is part of a wider development of using nuclear safety assessment
techniques to assess institutions systems that may well have wider
policy implementations beyond those for nuclear regulatory
systems.2. Background
2.1. Deﬁnitions
2.1.1. Stakeholders
The International Nuclear Safety Group deﬁnes stakeholder as
those who have a speciﬁc interest in a given issue or decision.
There are two types of stakeholders: internal stakeholders, who
are directly involved in the decision making process; and external
stakeholders comprising any organisation or individual that has a
legitimate interest in the decisions taken (INSAG, 2006).
The stakeholders are very diverse. They include members of the
nuclear industry, the general public, its governmental re-
presentatives such as the national and local governments, and
non-governmental entities such as NGOs and other interest
groups.
2.1.2. Regulatory accountability
The deﬁnition of regulatory accountability that will be used in
this paper is the following: for a regulator, to be considered ac-
countable it is required to justify both its decisions and actions and
to make the necessary changes should the explanation given be
judged unsatisfactory (see House of Lords Select Committee on the
Constitution (2004), Bird (2012)).2.1.3. Accountability mechanisms
An accountability mechanism can be broadly deﬁned as any
structural control that is used to meet the challenge of an orga-
nisation's accountability (Ogus, 1994). In OECD countries, the
mechanisms through which a regulatory body is held to account
typically include the following (OECD, 2002):
– Stakeholder consultations such as NGO forums public con-
sultations, public meetings, consultation with the nuclear in-
dustry etc.
– Parliamentary oversight in the form of annual reports, com-
mittee hearings, parliamentary questions etc.
– Oversight by the executive branch (i.e. by a ministry or a gov-
ernmental agency).
– Financial and performance audits.
– Appeal processes.
– Appointment process for leadership role within the regulatory
body.
2.2. Stakeholders and regulatory accountability
Whilst stakeholders may not know what the regulatory fra-
mework should look like or how the regulator should manage its
activities, they can always provide valuable input on its decisions
as they are directly affected by them and thus may perceive issues
the regulator overlooked.
The House of Lords’ Select Committee on the Constitution
(2004) identiﬁes three key elements to allow the stakeholders to
have an impact on a regulator's actions:
– The duty to explain: Regulators must provide information on its
activities to interested parties and explain the basis of the de-
cisions they take.
– Exposure to scrutiny: Regulators must provide the means
through which stakeholders can enquire about regulatory ac-
tivities and decisions.
– The possibility of independent review: Stakeholders must be able
to ask for an independent review of a regulatory decision so that
it may be overturned or altered.3. Problem description
Regulatory accountability is not a very active ﬁeld of study.
Accountability is mentioned in myriads of books and articles on
public administration (Bishop, 1990; Chandler, 1996; Deleon, 1997;
Harlow and Rawlings, 1997; White and Hellingsworth, 1999;
Woodhouse, 1997) and on regulation (Baldwin and McCrudden,
1987; Baldwin, 1995; Baldwin and Cave, 1999; Ogus, 1994) as it is
seen as a democratic requirement and a necessity to ensure an
effective public administration and effective regulators. However
the chapters dedicated to accountability only skim the surface and
readers must content themselves with a basic explanation of its
concept and brief descriptions of the various accountability me-
chanisms in place in the country in question.
The OECD (2002) provides details on what constitutes an ef-
fective system of accountability. These can be divided into two
parts.
Firstly, a strong set of legal requirements for regulators to up-
hold is needed to foster transparency and accountability. It must
include:
– A law setting explicitly the objective(s) of the regulator.
– Laws on information disclosure and requirements on respon-
siveness to information requests.
– Requirements for the regulator to seek the opinion of the
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– Requirements governing regulation-making processes to ensure
fair and transparent regulatory procedures.
Secondly, an effective system of accountability comprises the
following features.
– An appeal process that is clear, predictable, consistent and in-
dependent from the original decision-maker.
– An audit ofﬁce that is in charge of checking the quality of the
implementation of the regulations.
– Oversight of the regulator's activities by the parliament.
– A regulatory oversight body in charge of regulatory reform.
Only a few studies focus exclusively on systems of account-
ability. Bird (2012) writes on the accountability of two ﬁnancial
regulators in Australia and Graham (1998) and the Select Com-
mittee on the Constitution of the House of Lords (2004) study the
UK system of accountability.
Although each work describes the system of accountability of
interest with clarity, they do not provide substantial additions to
the ﬁeld of regulatory accountability. Bird (2012) argues for in-
cremental changes for several accountability mechanisms to ﬁnd
the best balance among accountability, independence and efﬁ-
ciency. Graham (1998) proposes the implementation of a common
set of regulatory procedures. The Select Committee on the Con-
stitution of the House of Lords (2004) similarly seeks the im-
plementation of legal requirements codifying the appropriate be-
haviour of regulators as well as more balanced appeal mechanisms
and parliamentary oversight.
Furthermore, these studies use different methods of assess-
ment, each lacking a systematic approach. They also use few, if
any, quantitative performance indicators to assess the systems of
accountability. As a result the studies cannot be used to compare
these systems to inform policy makers. Additionally, the degree of
subjectivity involved is detrimental to the accuracy of the
assessment.
Finally, the focus of these studies is not on the system of ac-
countability in question but rather on its individual parts. The
objectives the system of accountability should achieve are never
clearly stated. As a result these studies are unable to consider
neither the relative importance of each mechanism in achieving
them nor the combined effects of all the system's parts put to-
gether. Whilst the importance of balancing accountability with
efﬁciency is recognised, neither the OECD nor the three studies
talk about the costs of the various accountability mechanisms.
The most relevant study regarding the accountability of the
nuclear regulator is the review of the British nuclear regulatory
environment requested by the Government and conducted in
2008 (Stone, 2008). Even though the accountability system is not
the main focus of the report, it does offer recommendations on
accountability to improve the effectiveness of the regulatory fra-
mework. Two propositions are of particular relevance: First, the
report recommended that a board of directors, composed of peo-
ple with relevant industry experience and representatives of var-
ious stakeholders, lead the nuclear regulator and hold it to account
for its performances. Second, it proposed the introduction of an
extended appeal process.
However, regulatory accountability is not the main thrust of the
report. The system of accountability is not discussed in its entirety,
nor are the costs and efﬁciency of various proposals analysed.4. Proposal for a new method of assessment
The objective of this work is to take the ﬁrst step towards
providing a systematic quantitative approach to assess institutions
that is ﬂexible and addresses the need described earlier. It seeks toevaluate different systems of accountability and provide quanti-
tative results allowing their comparisons.
4.1. Objective of an accountability system
In order to build a method of assessment on strong founda-
tions, it is necessary to ﬁrst address the basic issue that has never
been tackled head on: How is the effectiveness of a system of
accountability to be deﬁned? In a report entitled The Character-
istics of an Effective Nuclear Regulator, the Nuclear Energy Agency
proposes the following deﬁnition for a nuclear regulatory body:
‘Effectiveness is about how well an organisation is achieving its
fundamental purpose’.
Using past work on regulatory accountability and consulting
with nuclear regulators, staff of accountability mechanisms and
stakeholders, it was found that the fundamental and overarching
purpose of a system of accountability is to ensure that the nuclear
regulator is achieving its objective, that is, ensuring that nuclear
licensees operate their facilities in a safe manner (NEA, 2014).
4.2. New approach
4.2.1. Introduction
The approach proposed to provide a sound basis to the method
of assessment revolves around two key ideas. The ﬁrst is to use
risk assessment techniques used in the nuclear industry for nu-
clear safety as an inspiration for the assessment method as the two
issues share similar traits.
Indeed, in recent years, risks assessment methods have been
used in an increasing number of ﬁelds - Nepal and Jamasb (2013),
Nepal and Jamasb (2015a, 2015b), for instance, use them to eval-
uate the multi-faceted high impact risks the European electricity
network faces. Similarly, the aim here is to assess the effectiveness
of an accountability system by evaluating the effect regulatory
failures have on the frequency of high-impact events in nuclear
plants taken as reactor core damage which are extremely rare but
could lead to deaths or injuries or disruption of energy supplies.
(The Fukushima-Daiichi Accident had a signiﬁcant impact on en-
ergy supplies and the Japanese economy (Hosoe, 2015) but no
immediate deaths from ionising radiation and it has been pre-
dicted that there will be no discernible increase in stochastic
deaths (UNSCEAR, 2013)).
The nuclear safety case, which has long been used in the nu-
clear industry to demonstrate the safety of a nuclear facility or
activity, is of particular interest. Based on solid scientiﬁc founda-
tions, it uses a systematic approach and offers both a deterministic
and quantitative probabilistic risk-assessment approach to de-
monstrate that the risks posed by the facility or activity in ques-
tion have been reduced to reasonable levels and as low as rea-
sonable practicable (ALARP). The techniques involved in such as-
sessments provide the basis for the new approach to the assess-
ment of institutions introduced here.
The second idea is to model accountability mechanisms and
nuclear regulators as well as their decision-making processes,
looking at how faults can propagate through the system and
events build up to eventual signiﬁcant failure. The assessment of
systems of accountability would thus rely less heavily on the ob-
servable behaviour of these organisations and would be able to
assess the contribution of each individual accountability me-
chanism in the achievement of the system of accountability's
fundamental objective. Indeed, as most countries rely on similar
mechanisms to provide some regulatory accountability, and as
real-life experiments are not a possibility, modelling how they
function is the only approach that can accomplish this goal.
J. Lavarenne et al. / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 274–288 2774.2.2. Nuclear safety risk assessment
Nuclear safety risk assessment normally goes through the fol-
lowing steps (ONR, 2013):
– Identify all the possible hazards using systematic and thorough
identiﬁcation processes.
– Identify all possible faults that could trigger an undesirable
event using systematic and thorough identiﬁcation processes.
For instance combustible material is a hazard, and a spark is a
fault associated with it as this would ignite the material and
start a ﬁre.
– Identify the failure modes of the plant using systematic and
thorough fault sequence identiﬁcation processes
– Perform both deterministic and probabilistic analyses of the
plant design against these failure modes. The analyses must
demonstrate that the facility conforms to sound safety principles
such as defence in depth and that equipment important to safety
is going to work during its expected lifetime so as to prove the
design's strong tolerance against these failure modes.
4.3. Structure and rational of the method
4.3.1. Effectiveness of systems of Accountability
The IAEA (2016) provides a list of requirements for nuclear
regulators to follow whilst the NEA (2014) details the character-
istics they must possess. As both organisations compiled these
results thanks to substantial research on regulatory effectiveness,
it can be inferred with some conﬁdence that any deviation from
these standards would impede regulators from performing
effectively.
Ensuring the effectiveness of the regulatory authorities can
thus be thought as an effort to systematically detect and ﬁx these
deviations, or regulatory failures, and mitigate the negative impact
these may eventually have on the safety of nuclear facilities. This
occurs when the regulator fails to undertake its regulating duties
adequately, such as taking decisive action when an unacceptable
risk arises.
As a result, the assessment of the effectiveness of a system of
accountability can be done by evaluating the response of the nu-
clear regulator to combinations of regulatory failures. In particular,
the negative impact the nuclear regulator has on safety can be
used as a scale of effectiveness for its system of accountability.
4.3.2. Analogy with the nuclear safety risk assessment
Table 1 presents the different analogies that can be drawn
between the nuclear safety risk-assessment method and the
method for assessing the effectiveness of a system ofTable 1.
Analogies between the risk assessment for nuclear safety and the proposed method
for assessing the effectiveness of a system of accountability.
Dimension Safety case Accountability
Source of danger Hazards and asso-
ciated faults
Regulatory failures
Impact on system Fault sequences Failure sequences a and their
impact on regulatory
processes
Consequences for
safety
Probability of in-
cident/accident
Damages incurred
Probability of poor regulatory
decision-making
Increase in risk incurred
Safety systems Protective safety
measures
Mitigating safety
measures
Mechanisms detecting and
ﬁxing regulatory failures
Appeal mechanisms
a Failure sequences describe how regulatory failures may trigger or worsen the
gravity of other regulatory failures.accountability.
These analogies suggest that the proposed method should have
the following steps:
– Systematic identiﬁcation of regulatory failures
– Systematic identiﬁcation of failure sequences
– Modelling the regulatory processes associated with each reg-
ulatory activity
– Using research on human and organisational factors in prob-
ability safety - assessments to infer the impact regulatory fail-
ures have on regulatory processes
– Modelling the processes of accountability mechanisms
– Identify measurable indicators for the principles for effective
accountability
– Using research on human and organisational factors in prob-
ability safety assessments to infer the performance of the pro-
cesses of accountability mechanisms using the data gathered
The ﬁrst step deals with identifying the undesirable events that
may occur within a regulatory body. The second, third and fourth
aim at exploring the potential consequences these events may
have on the regulator's performance and thus on the safety of the
facilities it oversees. The three ﬁnal steps look at the ‘safety sys-
tems’ and their characteristics.
Once these steps have been carried out and all the necessary
data on the regulator and the system of accountability have been
collected, we can then assess the robustness of the entire system –
nuclear regulator and its system of accountability – against reg-
ulatory failures.
Modelling the processes of both the regulator and the me-
chanisms that hold it to account will allow us to perform a si-
mulation of the nuclear regulator's behaviour over the years, after
it has been afﬂicted with a combination of regulatory failures. We
will thus be able to observe, year after year, the spread of reg-
ulatory failures, and their growing impact on the quality of the
regulator's output. Most importantly, we will be able to assess the
capacity of the system of accountability to prevent the regulator
from degrading the level of safety in nuclear facilities.5. Test-case Monte-Carlo simulation
The work presented here is a test case for the development of
the proposals for quantitative assessment of institutions using a
Monte-Carlo simulation run on MATLAB.
5.1. Institution modelling
For the simulation, ﬁve institutional components were mod-
elled: a nuclear regulator, one stakeholder and three account-
ability mechanisms. For simplicity, and to ensure rapid con-
vergence of the Monte-Carlo simulation, all the components but
the regulator are modelled as a single-working unit. Each pos-
sesses a set of characteristics which impact how well it performs
the tasks it has been assigned.
5.1.1. Nuclear regulator modelling
5.1.1.1. Basis. The nuclear regulator in this simulation is composed
of 22 staff, 20 junior staff and 2 senior staff. They carry out two
activities: developing new regulation and inspections. Half the
staff deals with inspections whilst the other half focuses on safety
standards.
The inspection process and the regulation-making process are
displayed in Fig. 1. Fig. 1a displays the inspection process whilst
Fig. 1b displays the rule-making process. Actions in green cases are
performed by individual junior staff, in blue cases by a group of
Fig. 1. Decision-action diagrams describing the two activities of the nuclear regulator inspections (a) and rule-making (b).
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Each junior inspector is in charge of one nuclear plant. The
regulation-making junior staff on the other hand, works all to-
gether to develop new regulation.
5.1.1.2. Regulator's performance and safety. For the simulation, we
assume regulatory staff possesses only one characteristic impact-
ing their ability to ensure safety: expertise.
Each inspection has a chance to focus on an area where the
operator fails to comply with the regulations. It is assumed that
any safety standard violation is associated with an increase in risk,
expressed in reactor core damage frequency, from ALARP levels.Thus the role of the inspector is to detect such lack of compliance
and take action.
In the United States, plant inspectors perform on average 33
inspections per plant year (NRC, 2005). In addition, in 2012, 5 re-
actors out of 104 were found to have degraded performances (NRC,
2013). Thus, in the model, it is assumed that junior inspectors
perform 33 inspections per year and each inspection has a 5%
chance to be in an area where the operator does not comply with
the regulations.
The chosen probability density distribution for the associated
risk increase is displayed in Fig. 2. It is constant for risks comprised
between 0 and R0 and then decreases exponentially:
Fig. 2. Probability density distribution of risk.
Fig. 3. Probability of the stakeholder appealing a decision as a function of beneﬁts
over costs.
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the risk R to be below R0 is 90%. A is the normalisation constant
ensuring ( )∫ =p R dR 1. R0 was chosen to be − −years10 .7 1 .
In the simulation, the expertise of each inspector impacts the
probability for him/her to detect the full extent of the operator's
lack of compliance. Therefore the impact on safety an inspector
has can be quantiﬁed by the difference between the risk increase
due to the operator's lack of compliance and the risk increase
prevented by the inspector.
The aim of developing new regulations is to improve safety and
therefore reduce the risk posed by nuclear plants. In the simula-
tion, the expertise of the staff affects their ability to identify the
areas where safety standards could be strengthened and to gather
international experience, expert opinion and new scientiﬁc ﬁnd-
ings in order to maximise the risk reduction.
Rule-makers develop four new regulations per year aimed at
reducing the risks to ALARP levels. The risk reductions these can
potentially achieve follow the same probability distribution as the
one used for inspections. R0 was chosen so that the contribution of
rulemaking and inspections to risk reduction is the same on
average. A and B were chosen to satisfy the same conditions used
for inspections given the same level of expertise of junior staff.
Table 2 provides the numerical values for A, B and R0 for both
inspections and rule-making.
The impact on safety of the rule-making staff is therefore the
difference between the risk reduction the new regulations would
ideally achieve and the risk reduction actually obtained.
There is a probability for junior staff to fail to adequately per-
form the task they have been assigned. It is equalled to ×k expertise
R
. R
is the ideal risk reduction the regulatory task could achieve and k
is a constant chosen so that for =R R0 and for an expertise of 65%,
the probability is equalled to 0.1%. Should they perform the task,
the probability of success is equalled to its expertise whilst the
probability of failure is equalled to one minus its expertise. In case
of success, the risk reduction achieved by the task is equalled to R.
In case of failure the risk reduction achieved by the task is equalled
to ×R expertise.
There are several instances when the tasks done by a junior
staff are reviewed. If the risk reduction achieved by an inspection
is above R0, the senior inspector reviews the work. The entire
junior rulemaking staff reviews the work made by each rulemak-
ing staff and the regulation draft is reviewed by the seniorTable 2.
Constants used for the probability density distribution of risk for inspections and
rulemaking.
Inspections Rulemaking
R0(
−years 1) −10 7 × −4.1 10 7
A (years) ×9 106 ×2.2 106
B (years) ×9 107 ×2.2 107rulemaking staff. There is a probability that the review is not
performed. It is equalled to ×k expertise
R
. k is chosen so that for =R R0
and for an expertise of 88%, the probability is equalled to 1%. For
the group review, the average expertise of the junior rulemaking
staff is taken as expertise. If the task was done correctly, the work
is left unchanged. If it was not, the probability for the review to
successfully notice the ﬂaws of the work is equalled to the ex-
pertise of the reviewer. If the ﬂaws are noticed, the work is done
again and successfully, if they are not, the work is left unaltered.
5.1.2. System of appeal (accountability mechanism 1)
The ﬁrst accountability mechanism is a system of appeal sta-
keholders can call on to overrule a regulatory decision they ﬁnd
improper. The mechanism follows the process described in Fig. 4a.
Its characteristics are expertise, time and resources which impact
its capacity to judge accurately regulatory decisions.
The main simpliﬁcation for the appeal mechanism is that it can
either uphold a regulatory decision or replace it with a better one
but cannot take a decision that would make matter worse than the
initial decision taken by the regulator (worse, in terms of negative
impact on safety).
Its ﬁnal attribute is ease, which provides information on how
easy it is for a stakeholder to win an appeal. For instance, re-
stricting the grounds on which an appeal may be ﬁled is particu-
larly effective to reduce the probability of a successful appeal.
Stakeholder modelling
In the simulation there is only one stakeholder. The main
simpliﬁcation made is that the stakeholder is completely informed
of the activities undertaken by the regulator.
It reviews each regulatory decision made, and based on this
assessment, it decides whether to appeal the decision using the
ﬁrst accountability mechanism.
The stakeholder possesses one main characteristic, expertise,
which affects the accuracy of the assessment it makes of reg-
ulatory decisions. In addition it is allocated a yearly budget which
sets a limit to the amount of appeals it can sue for.
Fig. 3 shows the probability for the stakeholder to appeal a
decision as a function of beneﬁts to costs ratio. The beneﬁts are the
perceived difference between the maximum core damage fre-
quency reduction the regulator could achieve and the reduction
actually obtained times the likelihood of winning the appeal given
by the ease of the system of appeal. The costs are the appeal costs
to the stakeholder. If the beneﬁts to costs ratio is below a certain
threshold T, the stakeholder does not appeal, above T, the prob-
ability to appeal rises linearly and is equalled to 1 when the
beneﬁts over costs reaches the value T
k
where k is constant be-
tween 0 and 1.
5.1.3. Audit ofﬁce (accountability mechanism 2)
The second accountability mechanism is an audit ofﬁce. It deals
with management and organisational failures of the regulator and
Fig. 4. Decision-action diagrams describing the processes through which the regulator is held to account.
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tions against these failures. It follows the process displayed in
Fig. 4b. In the simulation, the only way to trigger an audit is for the
audit ofﬁce to become aware of poor regulatory performance
thanks to the appeal mechanism records. The probability of theaudit ofﬁce starting an investigation is proportional to the amount
of regulatory decisions having been repealed during the year.
The attributes of the audit ofﬁce are similar to the ﬁrst ac-
countability mechanism: expertise, time and resources all impact
the ofﬁce's capability to identify both the source of the problem
Fig. 6. Triangular probability density function.
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focus, describing how much a priority is the nuclear regulator for
the audit ofﬁce; and communication with the ﬁrst accountability
mechanism which gives a measure of the extent of information
exchange between the two institutions.
5.1.4. Parliamentary scrutiny (accountability mechanism 3)
The third accountability mechanism deals with regulatory
failures that can only be tackled through an act of the parliament.
Thus this mechanism is the combination of a body (such as a
Parliamentary Select Committee) whose role is to detect these
failures and ﬁnd adequate solutions and the parliament, whose
role is to make the former's proposals a reality. The process fol-
lowed is shown in Fig. 4c.
As the body in charge of detecting regulatory failures share
similar features with the audit ofﬁce, it is modelled in the simu-
lation using the same characteristics. They are namely, expertise,
time, resources, focus and communication with the second ac-
countability mechanism. The parliament is described by only one
characteristic: political risk which is a measure of the capacity of
members of parliament to set aside politics and take the necessary
actions.
5.2. Regulatory failure modelling
The sequence of regulatory failures chosen for the Monte-Carlo
simulation is displayed in Fig. 5. It shows the effects deep cuts of
the nuclear regulator's budget have on the training quality of the
regulatory staff, which over time impacts its expertise.
5.3. Simulation
Time is discretised in time steps of 1 year. The state of the
system at time t is represented by the expertise score of each
regulatory staff, the quality of the initial training and the status of
continuous training.
Initially the regulator is effective. Each staff is assigned an in-
itial expertise score using a probability density function presentedFig. 5. Diagram displaying the failure sequence the regulator is afﬂicted.in Fig. 6. Where, av is the average expertise score and it is set at
65% and 88% for junior and senior staff respectively.
There are two mechanisms which impact the evolution of the
expertise of the regulatory staff.
The ﬁrst is staff turnover: each year, every junior staff has a
probability of 8% to leave whilst every senior staff has a probability
of one sixteenth to leave. Thus, on average, 1.6 junior staff leaves
per year and one senior staff leaves every eight years. A junior staff
leaving is replaced by a new recruit. A senior staff leaving is re-
placed by one of the three best junior staffs of the appropriate ﬁeld
(inspection or regulation), chosen at random. The junior staff
taking over as senior staff is in turn replaced by a new recruit.
New recruits are trained and assigned an expertise score using
the same triangular probability density function, with the average
expertise equal to the quality score of the initial training.
The second mechanism is continuous training. All regulatory
staff are continuously trained to ensure they progressively gain
expertise. Every year, the expertise score of each regulatory staff
changes by a certain amount, assigned using the triangular prob-
ability density distribution displayed in Fig. 6. The average ex-
pertise variation is dependent on the status of the continuous
training described below.
It is assumed that the initial training is run by the junior reg-
ulatory staff, thus the quality of the training is impacted by the
expertise of the junior staff. The quality of the initial training is set
at 75% of the average expertise score of the junior staff. When the
budget reduction is introduced, the quality of the initial training
drops to 45%. It remains there until 75% of the average expertise
score of the junior staff falls below this value, at which time the
former relationship between the two variables is restored.
Both senior and junior staff expertise score cannot drop below
15%.
The status of continuous training can assume several possible
discrete values displayed in Table 3 along with the associated
average yearly expertise score variation.
The simulation runs for 60 years. At t¼0 the budget reduction
is introduced, causing an immediate drop in the quality of initial
training and the continuous training status is switched to failing.
The stakeholder can appeal any regulatory decisions made
during the year whilst poor regulatory performance may trigger an
audit the same year or several years in the future.Table 3.
Status of the continuous training
and the associated average yearly
variation in expertise.
Status Average variation
Failing 1%
Less failing 0.5%
Not failing þ1.5%
Boosted þ6%
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performance and successfully implements tangible improvements,
the status of continuous training switches from failing to less
failing. In addition, the regulatory staff must attend an intensive
course which increases their expertise score by 10%.
Should the audit ofﬁce solutions be found insufﬁcient to ade-
quately restore the effectiveness of the regulator, the third appeal
mechanism may launch a more in-depth investigation which may
eventually result in an act of parliament solving the budget issue.
When the budget issue is solved, the continuous training status
changes from less failing to boosted, as training becomes a priority.
Only when the average junior expertise score reaches 65% does its
status switch to not failing.Fig. 8. Pdf of the average junior expertise for accountability system C, at time 20,
40 and 60 years.
Fig. 9. Pdf of the cumulative difference between ideal and actual decrease in risk
per plant achieved by the regulator.6. Results and discussion
10,000 independent iterations were performed to reduce the
statistical errors of the results. However, as this simulation is
merely a proof of principle, statistical uncertainties will not be
discussed in this work.
6.1. Impact of accountability systems
Figs. 7–9 illustrate the impact of the three different systems of
accountability (SoA) on regulatory expertise and on nuclear safety.
System A is only made of an appeal mechanism, system B is made
of the appeal and the audit mechanisms whilst system C is made
of all three accountability mechanisms.
Figs. 7 and 8 present the probability density function (pdf) of
the average expertise of the junior regulatory staff, at three times,
20, 40 and 60 years for accountability systems B and C respec-
tively. The pdf is used to calculate the probability P(t) that for a
random simulation run, the regulator will have an average junior
expertise at time t between E1 and E2:
∫( ) ( )= ( )P t p E t dE, 1E
E
1
2
Where p(E,t) is the pdf of the average expertise of the junior
regulatory staff.
Only equipped with an appeal mechanism, the accountability
system A cannot impact the expertise of the regulatory staff. As a
result, in Fig. 7, the pdf of the average junior expertise is the same
as for a failing regulator without an accountability system. Ex-
pertise decreases continuously until it reaches its lower limit ofFig. 7. Pdf of the average junior expertise for accountability system B, at time 20,
40 and 60 years.15%. After 20 years, the average expertise of the junior regulatory
staff is comprised between 15% and 35%. At later times t¼40 and
60 years, in all the simulation run, the staff has the minimum
possible expertise and the pdf of the average expertise is thus a
Dirac delta function.
With system B, at time t¼20 years, the pdf is formed of two
bell curves, one with a peak at 27%, and another, with a smaller
peak at 39% but larger width. This shows that in the simulation,
one of these two scenarios happened: either the audit ofﬁce de-
tected the failings of the regulator and took action to resolve the
issue which resulted in an average junior expertise between 32%
and 50%. Or the audit ofﬁce failed to detect any regulatory failures,
and the average junior expertise continued to fall as with system
C. Using Eq. (1), the probability of each scenario was found to be
50:50. At time 40 and 60 years, the pdf is only formed of one bell
curve that becomes growing taller and thinner with time and
whose peak gradually approaches 15%. At t¼60 years, the pdf
peaks to 94 at an average junior expertise of 15%. This emphasises
that the audit ofﬁce, as it does not possess the power to tackle the
real root cause of the issue, can only slow down the inexorable loss
of regulatory expertise. This may have implications for policy
makers.
Fig. 10. Costs of accountability system A.
Fig. 11. Costs of accountability system B.
Fig. 12. Costs of accountability system C.
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formed of three bell curves. The ﬁrst one is identical to the one
found for system B. This is hardly surprising as their respective
audit ofﬁce have the same characteristics and thus have the same
chance to have detected the regulatory failure during the ﬁrst 20
years. The second bump in the pdf peaks at 39% whilst the third
and smallest peaks at 66%. The shape of the curve indicates that
three possible scenarios can occur, either the audit fails to identify
any regulatory failures, either the audit ofﬁce does act but the
third accountability mechanism does not, or both mechanisms act
and the root cause for the poor performance of the regulator is
found and ﬁxed. Using the pdf to calculate the probabilities of each
outcome, the split was found to be 50:40:10. Pdfs at times 40 and
60 years indicate that the chances for the regulatory failure to go
unnoticed becomes slimmer as time goes by, as might be expected.
After 60 years, there is still a 15% chance that the accountability
system has yet to resolve the issue however.
Fig. 9 shows the pdf of the cumulative difference between ideal
and actual core damage frequency decrease achieved by the
regulator.
As expected, the system A is the least effective. The cumulative
core damage frequency increase per plant has a 95% chance to be
between 0.8 and 1.1× − −years10 3 1. Compared with the pdf obtained
without any accountability mechanism, it is simply shifted 4× −10 4
−years 1 to the left, which gives the direct impact of the appeal
mechanism on nuclear safety.
With system B, the spread of the cumulative core damage
frequency increase is much wider. There is a 90% chance for it to
be between 2 and 7× −10 4 −years 1. Indeed the faster a successful
audit is made, the more impact it will have. Its action marginally
improves the regulator's continuous training program thus at-
tenuating the yearly drop in expertise which in turn impacts the
quality of its work.
With a full accountability system, there is a 8% chance for the
cumulative core damage frequency per plant to be at the level of a
healthy regulators at −10 5 −years 1, and a 45% chance to be below
−10 4 −years 1, less than the most optimistic scenario for a failing
regulator with accountability system B. The probability density
then decreases slowly between 0.2 and × − −years1.0 10 3 1. Again, the
explanation for this behaviour is that the sooner the audit ofﬁce
and the third accountability mechanism successfully act to resolve
the regulatory failures, the greater the impact on the core damage
frequency increase.
These numbers may seem quite high, especially for a healthy
regulator, but in the simulation, it is assumed that a regulatory
error cannot be rectiﬁed later on. As a result, even after the ac-
countability system resolves the budgetary issues of the regulator,
the damage done cannot be undone.
6.2. Costs of accountability systems
Figs. 10–12 provide the details of the average costs of each ac-
countability system. The costs of individual accountability me-
chanisms are given without using a discount rate so as to offer a
good indication as to when they are being used. For the total cost
of a system of accountability, both the undiscounted and dis-
counted costs are shown. A constant discount rate of 5% was used
for the simulations.
The activities of system A are straightforward. As the regulatory
expertise tumbles, the quality of its work suffers and the stake-
holders appeal decisions more and more frequently. As the result,
the cost of the appeal system increases sharply. The stakeholders
have limited funding however. Thus, demands for appeals pla-
teaued after 20 years.
The appeal mechanism in system B is marginally less used thanin system A as the regulatory expertise is, on average, raised by the
actions of the audit ofﬁce. The cost of the audit ofﬁce increases
with time, mirroring the rise in the appeal cost. Indeed, the
probability of an audit being launched is proportional to the
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year. The ﬁrst successful appeal offers marginal and temporary
improvements to the regulator. The audit ofﬁce can conduct more
audits, but without the third accountability mechanism, these will
have no impact on regulatory expertise. Thus the cost of audits
eventually plateaus instead of decreasing.
With system C, the audit ofﬁce costs are tightly linked to its
system B counterpart during the ﬁrst 20 years. In addition, during
this time period, the cost curve for the third accountability me-
chanism is of the same shape as the audit ofﬁce cost, only shifted
by about 5 years. After 20 years, both the cost of the audit ofﬁce
and of the third accountability mechanism decreases at the same
pace. This means that, on average 5 years after a ﬁrst audit, the
third accountability mechanism takes action and resolves the
regulatory issue. Due to its actions, the chances for the regulator to
be failing decreases with time. This ultimately results in the slow
decrease of the average costs of all three accountability
mechanisms.
6.3. Comparison of costs and beneﬁts of accountability systems
The simulation also provides the means to compare average
costs and beneﬁts of the different systems of accountability.
The costs of the system are simply the sum of the costs of each
accountability mechanisms.
In order to provide an estimate of the beneﬁts, the increase in
risk experienced due to the poor performances of the regulator
were multiplied by the cost of an accident. In this simulation, it
was assumed that this cost is merely the loss of revenue for the
operator due to the plant's early closure. Thus, the cost of an ac-
cident is, on average, the average revenue of a nuclear plant per
day times the average time left before closure.
It was assumed that the 10 plants in the simulation have a
lifetime of 60 years, that they all have been constructed 6 years
apart and that every time a plant closes, a new one comes online.
The average revenue of a plant per day was chosen to be
d1,000,000.
The results are displayed in Table 4. It displays the average
cumulative cost for the system of accountability, the average cu-
mulative risk increase per plant and the average cost due to early
plant closures over the duration of the simulation. Finally, it dis-
plays the cost beneﬁt ratio where the cost is the cumulative cost of
the accountability system while the beneﬁt is the avoided costs
due to early plant closures thanks to the accountability system.
Based on these numbers – which are not meant to be taken
literally - each additional accountability mechanism results in a
better value for money.
The cost beneﬁt ratio drops from 0.59 with only one appeal
mechanism to 0.3 with all three accountability mechanisms.
As previously mentioned, the simulation does not allow the
regulator to rectify errors it has done in the past. It results in a
higher risk increase, especially for healthy regulators as they are
more likely to notice a past regulatory error and take the necessary
actions. Thus the increase in core damage frequency and in cost
due to early plant closures are overestimated.Table 4.
Costs and beneﬁts of the three systems of accountability.
No SoA
Cost of the accountability system (Md) over 60 years NA
Cumulative increase in risk per plant ( −
−
yrs10 3
1
) over 60 years
1.32
Cost due to early plant closures (Md) over 60 years 265
Cost beneﬁt ratio NA6.4. Discussion
This section highlights that this very simple Monte-Carlo si-
mulation can be used for studying a wide range of scenarios. For
instance, one could explore the effect of stakeholder funding on
the performances of the system of accountability, or compare a
system of accountability having a quick and inexpensive appeal
mechanism with a system having a long and expensive one. In-
deed, it can provide useful information to policy makers in de-
termining a new regulatory system of enhancing an existing one.
However, it is important to note that some the simpliﬁcations
used reduce the potential uses of the simulation in its current
form, although the further work planned is anticipated to address
such issues.
For example, since there is only one regulatory failure se-
quence, only one audit and one investigation performed by the
third accountability mechanism are required to solve the problem.
As a result, the simulation cannot be used to study the impact of
different amounts of funding for the audit ofﬁce and the third
accountability mechanism.
In addition, the possibility of exploring the relative importance
of each accountability mechanism is reduced by two key
assumptions:
An audit can only be launched following the overturn of a
regulatory decision by the appeal mechanism and an investigation
by the third accountability system can only be launched once it
has been warned by the audit ofﬁce. In reality, these audits can be
triggered by many other events, such as the claims of a whistle-
blower.
However, this simulation is a proof of principle, the developed
method will be able to address these questions.
Other limitations include the simplicity of the decision-making
process models used (such as the process determining whether
the stakeholder appeals a regulatory decision) and the fact that the
probability distributions were chosen using best judgement. There
is extensive research on more elaborate and more realistic in-
formation processing and decision-making models (for example
Rehner and McCauley (2016), Zhu et al. (2016). Kavvadias and
Khamis (2014) describe the process to ﬁnd the best ﬁtted prob-
ability distributions for a Monte-Carlo simulation. These will be
studied further to enhance the accuracy of the method of
assessment.
Sensitivity studies were performed to analyse the impact of the
average junior expertise for a healthy regulator and of the discount
rate on the results. The results are in the appendix.7. Conclusion and policy implications
7.1. The research
One of the major causes of catastrophic events such as the
Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident and the collapse of banks that
led to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is the lack of an effective regulatory
regime. To assure effectiveness, regulatory systems have to be
backed up by an appropriate accountability system.SoA A SoA B SoA C Healthy regulator
48 58.5 58.9 22.7
0.93 0.45 0.22 0.01
184 92.3 67.8 8.0
0.59 0.34 0.30 NA
J. Lavarenne et al. / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 274–288 285In this paper it was argued that the optimisation of regulatory
accountability is held back by: (i) a lack of understanding of what
the objectives of such systems should be and, (ii) the absence of
systematic method to assess systems of accountability and allow
their comparison.
This paper addresses the ﬁrst of these issues by developing a
deﬁnition of an effective accountability system through stating its
fundamental aim and the necessary characteristics in order to
achieve it. It goes on to address the second issue by presenting a
method of assessment of accountability systems based on safety
assessment techniques used in the nuclear industry.
A simple Monte-Carlo simulation is reported that demonstrates
the principles of the method of assessment and illustrates the kind
of information and results it will be able to procure on regulatory
accountability systems.Table A.1.
Expertise constants used for each simulation of the sensitivity study.
Simulation 1 2 3 4 5
Healthy regulator
characteristics
av. junior expertise
(%)
60 65 70 75 80
av. expertise of new
recruit (%)
40.2 48.8 57.3 65.8 74.37.2. Policy implications
Three distinct groups stand to beneﬁt from this research. First,
it will provide policy makers in governments tools to model the
effectiveness and performance of nuclear regulatory systems of
accountability, and evaluate the likelihood that regulatory failures
lead to catastrophic failure of nuclear facilities. In turn this will
help them make informed decisions on the most cost-effective
way to fund each of their accountability mechanisms and help
them determine whether greater changes to their accountability
system is warranted. In addition, the results obtained will enable
them to strike a better balance between independence and ac-
countability of the regulator.
The research will also prove useful for nuclear regulatory
bodies. Modelling regulatory activities will provide regulators with
a tool to optimise the number of checks and balances each reg-
ulatory decision requires. This will in turn help them work toward
decision-making processes that are both resilient to regulatory
errors and efﬁcient. In addition the modelling could use likely
scenarios of future nuclear growth to inform regulators on their
future human resource needs, training and organisational
structures.
The last group that stands to beneﬁt from this work is the
nuclear stakeholders. It will provide them valuable information on
their nuclear regulatory authorities and their decision-making
processes as well as their system of accountability. This will ease
and promote their involvement and enable them to have a more
meaningful impact on regulatory decisions whilst reducing the
amount of time they must devote to the task. In turn, this may lead
to a greater trust and conﬁdence in the regulatory systems.
Such uses of are particular relevance to policy makers in those
countries (more than 30) who at present do not use nuclear power
as part of their energy mix but are developing a programmes to do
so to enhance energy security and address climate. Additionally,
the work is anticipated to be beneﬁcial to existing nuclear power
states who are seeking to learn the lessons from the Fukushima-
Daiichi Accident by enhancing their regulatory systems.
Finally work could also be used to improve cost-effectiveness of
regulators regulating the safety of other energy related ﬁelds such
as oil and gas and the chemical industry.av. rate of improve-
ment (%/year)
1.9 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.5
av. senior expertise
(%)
88 88 88 88 88
Failing regulator
characteristic
av. rate of improve-
ment (%/year)
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Impact of the average junior expertise for a healthy regulator
Method
Most variables used in the simulation were chosen arbitrarily
as the research needed to make an informed choice has yet to be
performed.
A sensitivity study was done to observe the impact of a change
in the average junior expertise of a healthy regulator on the results
obtained. The change thus affects both the initial average junior
expertise and the average junior expertise after the regulator has
been restored to its healthy condition by the system of account-
ability. For simplicity, in this section, the average junior expertise
of a healthy regulator is referred as the initial expertise.
For the study, it was decided to maintain the average senior
expertise of a healthy regulator constant at 88%. In order to satisfy
the steady-state equations for junior and senior expertise of a
healthy regulator however, both the average expertise of a new
recruit, as well as the continuous training improvement rate for a
healthy regulator had to be changed, alongside the average junior
expertise.
Table A.1 summarises the values used in each simulation.
For each simulation, the regulator starts to fail at time t ¼0,
when the budget cuts are introduced. The system of accountability
used for the sensitivity study is system C, comprised of all three
accountability mechanisms.
Results
Figs. A.1 and A.2 display the probability density function for the
average junior expertise at times t¼20 and 60 years respectively.
At t¼20 years, regardless of the initial expertise chosen, the pdf
curves obtained have a similar shape. They are all formed of three
bells that correspond to the three possible scenarios. Either the
audit ofﬁce fails to detect that the regulator is failing, either it does
detect it but the third accountability mechanism has yet to in-
vestigate, or both have successfully acted. An increase in initial
expertise has two main effects. First, it shifts the entire pdf to
greater expertise. Second, it reduces the probability for the audit
ofﬁce to detect the regulatory failure in the ﬁrst twenty years, from
55% for an initial expertise of 60% to only 25% for an initial ex-
pertise of 80%. Indeed, as the rate of improvement for a failing
regulator is the same in all simulation, the greater the initial ex-
pertise is, the longer it takes the regulator to reach a level of de-
terioration that prompts the audit ofﬁce to investigate, thus
starting the ‘healing’ process.
At t¼60 years, the pdf curves are all formed of two bells which
represent the two possible scenarios: If the third accountability
mechanism has ﬁxed the root cause of the poor performances of
the regulator, it is either healthy or quickly improving and has an
Fig. A.1. Pdf of the average junior expertise at time t¼20 years for different values
of initial junior expertise.
Fig. A.2. Pdf of the average junior expertise at time t¼60 years for different values
of initial junior expertise.
Fig. A.3. Pdf of the cumulative difference between ideal and actual decrease in risk
per plant achieved by the regulator for different values of initial junior expertise.
Table A.2.
Costs and beneﬁts of the system of accountability for different values of initial
junior expertise.
Initial junior expertise 60% 65% 70% 75% 80%
Cost of accountability system (Md)
over 60 years
60.4 58.9 56.8 53.5 49.9
Cumulative increase in risk per
plant ( −
−
yrs10 3
1
) over 60 years
0.251 0.216 0.172 0.127 0.085
Cost due to early plant closures
(Md) over 60 years
87.2 68.5 49.7 34.6 22.5
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countability mechanism has yet to resolve the budgetary issue, the
average junior expertise is close to the minimum.
For an initial expertise between 60% and 70%, the pdf curves are
nearly identical. All three have the same bell curve, centred at an
average junior expertise of 17% and their second bell curve have
the same shape, albeit centred on their respective initial expertise.
For higher initial expertise, the ﬁrst bell curve becomes wider
and shifts to higher expertise, from 19% for an initial expertise of
75–30% for an initial expertise of 80%. The second bell curve keeps
the same width as for lower initial expertise and continues to be
centred on the respective initial expertise; however the peak value
of their pdf slowly decreases from 5.5 for an initial expertise of 70%
to 4.3 for an initial expertise of 80%.
Regarding the probabilities for each scenario to happen, for an
initial expertise between 60% and 70%, the probability for the third
accountability system to have resolved the regulatory failure after
60 years is constant at 85%. For higher initial expertise, the prob-
ability drops sharply to only 65% for an initial expertise of 80%.
Fig. A.3 displays the impact of the initial expertise on the in-
crease in risk for each plant resulting from the budget cuts im-
posed to the nuclear regulator.The curves of all probability density functions have the same
shape. They peak at a very low core damage frequency and sharply
decrease with increasing risk.
The peak value of the pdfs rises and the peak position shifts to
lower core damage frequency as the initial expertise is increased.
With an initial expertise of 60%, the pdf reaches its maximum of
4.6 at × − −years4 10 5 1 and with an initial expertise of 80% the pdf
reaches its maximum of 11.5 at × − −years2 10 .5 1 .
In addition, the higher the initial expertise is, the sharper is the
fall in the value of the pdf with increasing core damage frequency.
In terms of probabilities, the cumulative increase in risk per
plant has only a 50% chance of being smaller than at × − −years2 10 4 1
for an initial expertise of 60%. The probability reaches 90% for an
initial expertise of 80%. There is a 99% chance that the cumulative
increase in risk per plant is below − −years10 3 1 and at
× − −years5 10 4 1for the former and latter case respectively. Thus, in-
creasing initial expertise from 60 to 80% on average halves the
increase in risk due to budget cuts.
Table A.2 summarises the costs and beneﬁts of the system of
accountability for each simulation made. The cost of the system of
accountability decreases only marginally when the initial junior
expertise is increased. However both the cumulative increase in
risk and the cost due to early plant closure plummet with an in-
creasing initial junior expertise. Naturally, maintaining a higher
level of expertise would incur greater expenditures for the reg-
ulator. However, this simple model only focuses on the effective-
ness of the system of accountability, not the regulator itself. Thus,
whilst the cost of the regulator should signiﬁcantly rise with an
increased junior expertise, the cost of the accountability system
falls marginally.
This sensitivity study shows that increasing the initial junior
expertise delays the action of the system of accountability. Thus, a
regulator with higher initial junior expertise takes, on average,
Table A.3.
Costs and beneﬁts of the systems of accountability for different discount rates.
Discount rate No SoA SoA A SoA B SoA C Healthy regulator
0% Cost of accountability system
(Md) over 60 years
NA 164 216 189 68
Cost due to early plant closures
(Md) over 60 years
2390 1673 787 508 42
Cost beneﬁt ratio NA 0.23 0.13 0.10 NA
1% Cost of accountability system
(Md) over 60 years
NA 121 157 142 51
Cost due to early plant closures
(Md) over 60 years
1495 1056 495 328 29
Cost beneﬁt ratio NA 0.28 0.16 0.12 NA
3% Cost of accountability system
(Md) over 60 years
NA 72 91 87 32
Cost due to early plant closures
(Md) over 60 years
610 426 206 144 14.5
Cost beneﬁt ratio NA 0.39 0.23 0.19 NA
5% Cost of accountability system
(Md) over 60 years
NA 48 58.5 58.9 22.7
Cost due to early plant closures
(Md) over 60 years
265 184 92.3 67.8 8.0
Cost beneﬁt ratio NA 0.59 0.34 0.30 NA
10% Cost of accountability system
(Md) over 60 years
NA 23.2 27.3 29.0 12.8
Cost due to early plant closures
(Md) over 60 years
44.2 30.4 17.4 14.5 2.7
Cost beneﬁt ratio NA 1.68 1.01 0.98 NA
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the initial junior expertise has a very beneﬁcial impact on the
increase in risk and the cost due to early plant closure. Indeed,
with an increase in initial junior expertise from 60% to 80%, the
latter is divided by more than 3.
In the simulation, the simpliﬁcation was made to have only one
feature characterising the regulatory staff, one that therefore en-
compassed all characteristics that impact regulatory performance.
This sensibility study hence emphasises how crucial it is to iden-
tify these characteristics and to choose their value to best re-
present a healthy regulator.
Impact of the discount rate
Five different discount rates were used in this study to in-
vestigate the sensitivity of the results to the constant discount rate
chosen: 0%, 1%, 3%, 5% and 10%.
The results of the study are summarised in Table A.3. It displays
the average cost of the accountability system over 60 years, the
cost of early plant closures over 60 years and the cost beneﬁt ratio
for systems A, B and C using the ﬁve discount rates.
The results show that the cost due to early plant closure is
slightly more affected by an increase in the discount rate than the
cost of the accountability system is. This is because the un-
discounted cost of systems of accountability increases fast for the
ﬁrst twenty years before slowing down and even decrease for
system C. On the contrary, the cumulative risk due to poor reg-
ulatory performance can only increase with time since the model
does not allow the regulator to correct past mistakes. As a results,
the chances of a nuclear plant closing down early are highest at
time t¼60 years which in turn explains why an increase in the
discount rate has a greater impact on the cost due to early plant
closure.As a result, the cost beneﬁt ratio increases with the discount
rate. However, increasing the discount rate has no impact on the
relative efﬁcacy of the different accountability systems. System C
conserves the lowest cost beneﬁt ratio regardless of the discount
rate used. Thus, it can be concluded that for comparing the ef-
fectiveness of different systems of accountability, the choice of the
discount rate has only a limited impact.References
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